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Abstract 
Given the unprecedented scale of intergovernmental development funding and the importance 
of institutional quality for human wellbeing, it is imperative to precisely understand the impact 
of development funds on corruption. In Europe, EU Funds provide a boost to public spending 
in recipient member states while introducing additional corruption controls. We investigate 
whether EU Funds increase high-level corruption in the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2009-
2012. We analyse newly collected data from over 100,000 public procurement contracts to 
develop objective corruption risk indicators and link them to agency-level data of the public 
sector. Propensity score matching estimations suggest that EU funds increase corruption risks 
by up to 34%. The negative effects are largely attributable to overly formalistic compliance and 
EU Funds overriding domestic accountability mechanisms in public organisations entirely 
dependent on external funds. The policy implications are profound: governments should 
reduce barriers to market entry by lowering red tape and they should prevent excessive 
concentration of funds. 
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Given the unprecedented scale of intergovernmental development funding and the importance 
of institutional quality for human wellbeing, it is imperative to understand the impact of 
development funds on grand corruption in recipient countries. EU Structural and Cohesion 
Funds (EU Funds henceforth) constitute a considerable part of GDP in recipient member 
states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where they amount to 1.9%-4.4% of 
annual GDP (KPMG, 2012) and well above 50% of public investment. These funds represent 
the prime instrument supporting development in the EU’s least developed regions, hence they 
are essential to the cohesion of the whole EU. Given their importance, EU funds come with 
strings attached, most notably enhanced bureaucratic controls, requirements of transparency, 
and strengthened oversight mechanisms – all aimed at preventing misuse of public money. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to miss the ‘buzz’ around how corruption affects the spending of EU 
Funds across many new and old member states, from the Italian mafia hijacking highway 
projects to the European Commission freezing Structural Funds payments in Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Hungary. Some of these cases point to the involvement of high-level politics and 
organised criminal groups, raising the possibility that the EU in fact extensively finances large-
scale corruption in a number of countries. Even if only a fraction of such development funds 
is impacted by corruption, the negative effects are likely to be considerable in terms of 
malinvestment and distorted economic incentives, jeopardizing the territorial cohesion of the 
whole EU. If corruption in EU Funds spending is connected to high-level politics and organised 
crime, the ramifications are more severe, leading to distorted political competition and 
democracy.  
Given the perceived weaknesses of corruption control in EU Funds spending (though to date 
there is little hard evidence of this), the large sums involved, and the potential negative 
consequences of corrupt misspending, this paper sets out to explore the impact of EU Funds 
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spending on institutionalised grand corruption in CEE and to identify the main impact 
mechanisms. 
We focus on the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2009-2012. These EU member states score 
close to the average of the Corruption Perception Index for CEE EU member states (53.25 in 
2013) with scores of 48 and 54 respectively (Transparency International, 2013). They are 
considered to be successful reformers with GDP per capita converging to the EU average 
(reaching between 65-75% in 2009-2014) and both countries have avoided excessive, 
unsustainable budget deficits (close to or below the 3% benchmark). Despite sharing similar 
post-communist heritage and levels of development, they differ in their recent institutional 
trajectories. Hungary is increasingly backsliding on measures of democracy, openness, and 
integrity, making it more akin to the most corrupt EU member states such as Romania or 
Bulgaria. At the same time, the Czech Republic has remained relatively stable with slow 
improvements over time, making it more closely associated with good governance achievers 
in the region like Estonia. Given these two EU member states’ economic success and 
institutional framework, they represent the typical scenario for EU Funds spending: if 
corruption is increased by EU Funds in these countries, then it is likely to be the case in other 
recipient countries too. Given that even the poorest EU regions purport to have relatively high 
quality institutions compared to most aid recipients in the developing world, our findings can 
also depict an extreme case scenario for development funding globally. 
EU Funds are spent in many ways, and corruption controls are set up in different 
configurations that make it impossible to offer a blanket assessment of their impact on 
corruption. To counter this problem, we focus on public procurement spending by public or 
semi-public organisations (e.g. state-owned enterprises) which are financed from EU Funds. 
We then compare EU Funds to national funds. This approach offers the advantage of 
comparing government contracts that are similar in most respects except the source of 
financing and the accompanying control mechanisms. This approach delivers valid 
conclusions as to whether EU Funds increase or decrease the level of corruption in recipient 
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countries compared to domestic funds; it also allows us to investigate the mechanisms through 
which this impact occurs. Moreover, there is exceptionally good data available on public 
procurement spending between 2009-2012 in both countries at the individual contract level. 
This data has a unified data structure and source for EU as well as nationally funded contracts 
in both countries (note that public procurement regulations are identical regardless of funding 
source). 
There are three main contributions of this article: theoretical, empirical, and policy-related. 
First, we bring together two rich strands of the literature -- aid dependence scholarship and 
the Europeanization literature -- which have been largely unconnected so far. Bringing these 
two together allows us to comprehensively map the causal pathways between development 
funding and recipient country corruption. Our novel theoretical argument understands 
bureaucratic controls of corruption as actual facilitators of corruption by drawing on the most 
recent theoretical developments in corruption studies, which define corruption as restricted 
access to public resources. Second, we gather micro-level administrative data and develop 
novel objective corruption proxies in order to address a fundamental developmental question 
which hitherto has been analysed either qualitatively or using perception-based corruption 
indices on the country level. Our large-scale, micro-level quantitative database unearths a 
detailed picture of corruption on the level of individual contracts while also being broad enough 
to evaluate whole systems of governance. This data also allows for utilizing a propensity score 
matching methodology for estimating the causal effects that is superior to previously used 
regression methods. Third, we bring new evidence to a policy question fundamental to the 
territorial cohesion as well as institutional legitimacy of the EU at a time when both are 
increasingly questioned by elites as well as the wider population. Through claiming that EU 
Funds actually increase corruption risks in recipient CEE countries, the identified causal 
pathways allow for developing effective policy interventions, namely decreasing the 
bureaucratic burden associated with EU Funds disbursement and preventing recipient public 
bodies’ excessive reliance on such external funds. 
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The rest of the article is structured as follows: first, the main theoretical considerations and 
hypotheses are set out; second, data and indicators are presented and validated; third, 
empirical results are discussed; finally, conclusions are drawn and promising policy remedies 
are highlighted. 
Conceptual frame 
Corruption control mechanisms in EU Funds 
Spending EU Funds in comparison to national funds entails a more extensive accountability 
framework. First, it means public bodies have to comply with additional bureaucratic 
requirements, such as meeting ex-ante conditionalities and ex-post controls (Szabó et al., 
2016). Second, it also implies that projects have to comply with more extensive transparency 
requirements like sending spending data to dedicated national transparency portals or 
reporting to the European Commission (European Commission, 2016). Third, EU Funds 
spending is also supervised by additional domestic and European control bodies. For 
example, the European Commission audits and approves national monitoring and governance 
institutions dedicated to EU Funds; it also maintains its own oversight institutions such as the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) or the European Court of Auditors (European 
Commission, 2016). 
While EU Funds come with additional controls, they also represent investment money on top 
of national sources while following a distinct governance logic. First, they have to comply with 
spending priorities and project approval criteria set out in the general Structural and Cohesion 
Funds framework, which is aimed at supporting the convergence of least developed regions. 
These priorities and criteria can be alien to domestic allocation mechanisms, especially on the 
local level. Second, in virtually all CEE recipient countries, they represent an ample funding 
source that is hard, if not impossible, to deplete. This is a problem which has been attributed 
to absorptive capacity and excessive bureaucratic controls (KPMG, 2012). Such abundance 
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of funding is typically not the case for any national funding stream in the region. Third, EU 
Funds represent external funding with relatively little linked national contributions (typically 
about 15%) (Szabó et al., 2016), diminishing the sense of ownership and responsibility among 
voters as well as within the public administration. 
Corruption and aid 
Despite the unique features of EU Funds that would imply they have sharply different impacts 
from national funds, there has been remarkably little scientific work on the question to date 
(Beblavy & Sičáková-Beblavá, 2014; Mendrinou, 1994). There are, however, two bodies of 
literature that speak to this issue: the broad social science literature on aid dependence and 
the Europeanization literature in political science. Building on these two strands of thought, 
we derive a set of competing hypotheses that we can test.  
In both literatures, various corruption definitions are used explicitly or implicitly, some equating 
corruption with bribery while others focus on high-level corruption and favouritism. This paper 
looks at elite-driven, institutionalised forms of corruption, as they can fundamentally challenge 
democratic party competition, inclusive policy making, and fair market competition. In the 
particular empirical context we concentrate on -- i.e. public procurement -- institutionalised 
grand corruption denotes the allocation and performance of public procurement contracts by 
bending prior explicit rules and principles of good public procurement in order to benefit a 
closed network while denying access to all others (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; North, Wallis, & 
Weingast, 2009; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). 
There is extensive literature looking at the effect development aid and its associated 
accountability mechanisms have on the quality of institutions and corruption. However, 
applying this research to the context of CEE countries and EU Funds should be done with 
caution due to the significantly differing contexts and funding volumes (e.g., EU funding 
amounts to 3-4% of recipient countries’ GDP, whereas many developing countries receive aid 
worth more than 10% of GDP). Hence, EU Funds in CEE can be considered an extreme case 
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of development funding which is targeted at comparatively well-governed countries with 
substantial but relatively small spending values (i.e. financial dependence is more limited). 
According to this literature, foreign aid is expected to combat (high-level) corruption by 
providing clear policy goals like strengthening the civil service, improving bureaucratic control 
mechanisms, and overcoming the lack of resources for state building, as well as providing the 
resources to achieve these goals (Knack, 2001). 
However, development aid can also increase corruption and impede state building in a similar 
way as natural resources can (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008). It is expected to 
weaken domestic accountability mechanisms and the development of civil society by breaking 
the link between domestic revenues (i.e. taxation) and government services. It can also 
damage administrative capacity by (1) reallocating talented bureaucrats from domestic 
institutions to aid organisations and (2) providing additional organisational goals that 
undermine institutional cohesion (Knack & Rahman, 2007). In addition, development aid also 
increases the pool of public resources available for rent seeking which easily translates into 
additional corruption in contexts with weak administrative controls of corruption and systemic 
high-level corruption (Bräutigam, 2000). While these causal pathways may work to different 
degrees in the CEE context, the above arguments may still account for a large part of the 
mechanisms linking EU Funds to corruption in the region. In particular, disconnecting local 
spending from local taxes and redirecting bureaucratic effort are two impact mechanisms 
which may play a considerable role in weakening domestic accountability mechanisms; 
accordingly, they play a central role in the subsequent analysis. 
In the more specific Europeanization literature, few would debate that that the EU contributed 
to institution building and improvement of governance in CEE countries throughout the 
accession process (Epstein & Sedelmeier, 2009). It provided the highly popular goal of EU 
accession for CEE governments and guidance on which institutional improvements should be 
implemented to reach this objective (Meyer-Sahling, 2011). This process resulted in 
substantial reforms of public administrations, augmentation of democratic checks and 
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balances, and improvements in financial management. However, many authors expressed 
concerns that CEE countries reversed a range of reforms after accession and left many EU-
supported and/or requested new rules as ‘empty shells’ (Epstein & Sedelmeier, 2009; Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2007). These concerns stem from the EU’s diminishing leverage to keep new member 
states in line with principles of good government and the perceived limited embeddedness of 
many pre-accession reforms. Many of these reforms were either ‘implemented’ only on paper, 
or they simply created islands of excellence isolated from the rest of public administration 
(Goetz, 2001). 
Like the literature on aid dependency, the Europeanization literature argues that EU funds 
decrease corruption. First and most importantly, the disbursement of EU Funds is more heavily 
regulated, as was discussed above, which should make corruption more costly. Heavy 
administrative and regulatory requirements can also contribute to higher administrative 
capacity in the recipient organisations as they often have to invest in their bureaucracies to be 
able to receive and manage EU Funds. Second, extensive monitoring and controls of EU 
Funds, in addition to the usual national audit framework, make detection and punishment of 
corruption more likely than in projects funded with domestic funds (European Commission, 
2003; European Court of Auditors, 2012, 2013). Moreover, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union represents an additional venue for judicial review, meaning would-be 
participants in corruption cannot necessarily count on the capture of domestic courts as an 
effective way of avoiding punishment (David-Barrett & Fazekas, 2016). Third, one of Brussels’ 
most important remaining post-accession levers for disciplining new member states is EU 
Funds and the threat of withdrawing them (Epstein & Sedelmeier, 2009), which should 
motivate recipient countries’ elites to limit high-level corruption in these funds. 
Similar to the development aid literature, the Europeanization literature also argues that 
external funding, such as EU Funds in CEE, can damage the quality of government and 
increase corruption. First, EU Funds, like external funding in developing countries, weaken 
the link between domestic civil society, taxation, and policy performance. Second, EU funding 
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provides a large additional pool of public resources for rent extraction, increasing the potential 
benefits from corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). Third, EU Funds are spent on investment 
projects where public discretion is high. From the wider literature, it is clear that discretionary 
spending is more likely to involve corruption, especially high-level corruption, than non-
discretionary spending such as pensions (Mauro, 1998; Tanzi & Davoodi, 2001). While all 
these mechanisms might be at play simultaneously, the repeated claims that EU Funds may 
cut the link between local spending from local taxes and distort bureaucratic effort compared 
to local policy preferences are of particular importance. 
Following these theoretical arguments and building on an (sometimes only implicit) 
understanding in the literature that corruption results from the equilibrium between two 
countervailing forces, namely resources (discretion and resources) and constraints (legal, 
institutional, and normative) (Lambsdorff, 2007; Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1999), we can 
succinctly summarize the main mechanisms through which EU Funds increase or decrease 
corruption risks compared to the default national public procurement spending (Figure 1). This 
comparison between the additional effects of EU Funds on top of national funding and national 
funding alone is exactly what our empirical analysis sets out to do later on. 
<<Figure 1 here>> 
Thus far it is clear that the relationship between EU Funds and high-level corruption is 
theoretically ambiguous; only empirical evidence can decide which mechanisms are stronger 
in CEE. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: EU Funds increase institutionalised grand corruption in CEE. 
While it is of crucial importance to identify the main effect of EU Funds, the question of which 
particular impact mechanism plays which role remains open. To this end, two impact channels 
are investigated in detail, as they feature centrally in the theoretical discussion and we possess 
sufficient data on them. The first mechanism through which EU Funds are expected to 
increase high-level corruption concerns redirected bureaucratic effort. That is, EU Funds entail 
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many additional bureaucratic requirements that regulate and document bureaucratic 
processes. These additional requirements may weaken output orientation, encourage 
formalistic, ‘on-paper’ compliance, and impede open competition. In addition, demanding 
bureaucratic procedures act as a barrier to entry, directly decreasing the number of bidding 
firms hence encouraging the emergence of tight-knit networks of bureaucrats and 
businessmen. These arguments yield the following hypothesis: 
H2: EU Funds increase institutionalised grand corruption in CEE by redirecting 
bureaucratic effort toward formalistic, procedural compliance. 
The second and related impact mechanism through which EU Funds can increase high-level 
corruption is their capacity to fundamentally reconfigure organisational behaviour and 
motivational structure. This is expected to take place when EU Funds become the dominant 
or even the exclusive funding source for a public body. This can substantially distort the link 
between local taxes, policy preferences, and the public body’s spending behaviour, leading to 
weakened domestic accountability mechanisms. In contrast, when EU Funds represent a 
small to marginal proportion of total organisational procurement spending (i.e. low EU Funds 
spending intensity), they will most likely have no discernible impact on overall organisational 
behaviour. In addition, financial penalties for mismanaging funds are typically borne by the 
central budget rather than the implementing agency, further disconnecting local policy 
performance and local budgets and taxes. This non-linear effect of EU Funds concentrated at 
the upper end of the EU Funds spending intensity distribution leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: EU Funds increase institutionalised grand corruption in CEE for public bodies that 
are predominantly financed by EU Funds.  
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Data and variables 
Data 
The database derives from official public procurement announcements between 2009-2012 in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. The data represent a complete database of all public 
procurement procedures conducted under national public procurement laws regardless of the 
funding source (e.g. national funds or EU Funds). All government contracts above a given 
value threshold have to follow the transparency and procedural rules set out in legislation with 
a few exceptions, such as contracts of national security concern (for exact thresholds, see 
Appendix A). The database contains variables appearing in 1) calls for tenders, such as 
product specification, application deadline, or assessment criteria; 2) contract award notices, 
such as name of the winner, awarded contract value, or date of contract signature; 3) contract 
modification notices, such as the modified contract value; and 4) administrative corrections 
notices, containing the corrected value of any variable appearing in the other announcement 
types. As not all of these kinds of announcements appear for each procedure, for example 
depending on procedure type, we only have the information deriving from contract award 
notices consistently across every procedure. Both countries’ respective public procurement 
legislation is within the framework of the EU Public Procurement Directive and they are thus 
largely comparable. 
The data derive from official government online sources in each country (Appendix A) and the 
full database can be downloaded at digwhist.eu/resources/data. As there is no readily 
available database, we used a crawler algorithm to capture every announcement available 
online. Then, applying a complex automatic and manual text mining strategy, we created a 
structured database that contains variables with well-defined categories. As the original texts 
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available online contain a range of errors, inconsistencies, and omissions, we applied several 
correction measures to arrive at a database of sufficient quality for scientific research.3 
The resulting database describes at the micro-level a considerable proportion of GDP and 
public spending in these countries (Table 1). 
<<Table 1 here>> 
Variables used in the analysis 
As the main independent variable, the analysis looks at EU Funds use, both on the contract 
and organisational levels. For key dependent variables, the analysis takes corruption risk 
indicators, both as a single score and decomposed into individual components. Below we 
briefly define each of them. 
EU Funds use 
The spending of EU Funds in public procurement can be directly identified in each contract 
award announcement as it is mandatory to report whether EU Funds are used. No information 
is published on the proportion of EU funding within the total contract value. Hence, we had to 
employ a yes-no categorisation of each contract awarded. In most cases, regulation allows for 
the EU contribution to cover 80-95% of total investment; this threshold is typically reached due 
to the abundance of EU Funds. This paper’s accounting approach must necessarily disregard 
the national co-financing of 5-20% of contract value. When calculating the share of EU Funds 
in total organisational procurement, we sum the contract value of all EU funded contracts and 
calculate their share in the total contract value awarded in a year. 
                                               
3 For example, only the Czech Republic has a unique procedure ID for contract award announcements 
and calls for tenders. In Hungary, the announcements refer to each other in varying formats, making 
our linking procedure imperfect. For further description of database development, see Soudek & 
Skuhrovec (2013) on the Czech Republic and Fazekas & Tóth (2012a, 2012b) on Hungary. 
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Public procurement from EU Funds falls under the same procurement rules and thresholds as 
other funding sources. Common national and European public procurement legal frameworks 
warrant a meaningful comparison between EU funded and non-EU funded public procurement 
tenders. The crucial difference between these two types of tenders lies in additional monitoring 
and controls EU involvement brings, as well as the different motivation structures associated 
with spending EU Funds. The Czech Republic and Hungary have made use of EU funding in 
their procurement spending to broadly similar degrees, with Hungary drawing on EU Funds 
somewhat more extensively (Table 2). 
<<Table 2 here>> 
Indicators of institutionalised grand corruption 
Developing comparative indicators of institutionalised grand corruption in public procurement 
for both countries represents the primary methodological innovation of this article, addressing 
a gap long recognised in the literature (Knack, 2006). Our approach builds on prior scholarship 
with similar datasets, making use of a range of public procurement ‘red flags’ across Europe 
(Charron, Dahlström, Fazekas, & Lapuente, 2017; Fazekas & Kocsis, 2017; Klasnja, 2016; 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2016). 
The measurement approach exploits the fact that for institutionalised grand corruption to work, 
procurement contracts have to be awarded recurrently to companies belonging to the corrupt 
network. This can only be achieved if legally prescribed principles of fair competition and open 
access are circumvented by public officials during the implementation of procurement rules. 
By implication, it is possible to identify the input side of the corruption process, that is 
techniques used for limiting competition (e.g. leaving too little time for bidders to submit their 
bids) as well as the output side of corruption, that is signs of limited competition (e.g. single 
bid received and recurrent contract award to the same company). By measuring the degree 
of unfair restriction of competition in public procurement, proxy indicators of corruption can be 
obtained.  
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Based on qualitative interviews about corruption in the public procurement process in Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, a media content analysis in Hungary, and a review of international 
literature (Fazekas, Cingolani, & Tóth, 2016; Klasnja, 2016; OECD, 2007; Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers, 2013; World Bank, 2009), we identified a range of ‘red flags’ indicating corruption 
risks in public procurement (Table 3). The simplest indication of restricted competition in line 
with our theoretical definition is when only one bid is submitted for a tender in an otherwise 
competitive market. Single bidding typically allows the awarding of contracts above market 
prices and extracting corrupt rents (output side). Hence, the incidence of single bidder 
contracts awarded (i.e. contracts awarded in procurement tenders where only one bid was 
received by the contracting authority) is the most basic corruption proxy we propose. 
A more complex indication of high-level corruption incorporates characteristics of the 
tendering process that are in the hands of public officials who conduct the tender and 
contribute to competition restriction (input side). This more encompassing composite indicator 
is called the Corruption Risk Index (CRI). It consists of the following components (note that 
single bidding is also included):  
1. One of the most straightforward ‘red flag’ of corruption is a single bid being submitted. 
Since we are only examining competitive markets, the apparent lack of competition 
allows for awarding above-market price contracts and extracting corrupt rents. 
2. On competitive markets, it is unlikely to have the same company winning all the 
contracts of a given issuer, hence the very high share of the winning company within 
all the contracts awarded by the issuer in a given period can indicate rigged 
competition. Both a single bid being submitted and the winner’s high contract share 
are two outcomes of the competitive process which closely match the concept of 
institutionalised grand corruption in addition to having been identified as most reliable 
‘red flags’ in the literature (Kenny & Musatova, 2010). 
3. A simple way to fix tenders is to decline to publish a call for tenders in the official public 
procurement journal, as this would make it harder for competitors to prepare a bid.  
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4. Call for tender announcements provide the key document upon which bidding firms 
base their bids. Changing the bidding conditions such as technical content or eligibility 
criteria once or more after official publication creates uncertainty and can deter bidders, 
serving corrupt purposes.  
5. While open competition is relatively hard to avoid in some tendering procedure types, 
such as open tender, others, such as invitation tenders, are by default much less 
competitive; hence using less open and less transparent procedure types can indicate 
the deliberate limitation of competition, hence corruption risks. 
6. Eligibility criteria define which companies are allowed to bid. Tailoring the conditions 
to a single company is one of the most widely quoted means for corruptly limiting 
competition. Overly complex, hence lengthy criteria, are typical signs that criteria were 
‘over-specified’, most likely to the detriment of would-be competitors. 
7. If the advertisement period -- i.e. the number of days between advertising a tender and 
the submission deadline -- is too short for preparing an adequate bid, it can serve 
corrupt purposes whereby the issuer informally tells the well-connected company 
about the opportunity much earlier.  
8. Different types of evaluation criteria are prone to different degrees of manipulation. 
Subjective, hard-to-quantify criteria often accompany rigged assessment procedures, 
as they create room for discretion and limit accountability mechanisms. 
9. If the time used for deciding on the submitted bids is excessively short or lengthened 
by legal challenge, this can also signal corruption risks. Snap decisions may reflect 
premediated assessment, while legal challenge and the corresponding long decision 
period suggest outright violation of laws.  
<<Table 3 here>> 
Regressions were used to identify reliable and valid corruption proxies (“red flags”). 
Regressions aimed to directly model corrupt behaviour in public procurement by taking the 
two tendering outcomes that best capture our corruption definition as dependent variables: 
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single bidding and winner contract share. As independent variables, we used proxies of 
corrupt tendering processes (lack of publishing the call for tender, strategically modifying 
tender conditions, using non-open procedure types, etc.). These two regression set-ups 
closely approximate how a corruptly colluding public body and bidding firm would behave (e.g. 
applying short advertisement periods so that more productive competitors cannot reasonably 
bid), while also identifying bad procurement practice not associated with corruption (e.g. single 
bid submitted in the absence of a short advertisement period). To ensure our “red flags” 
measure corruption rather than incompetence or lack of competing firms, we restricted the 
sample to experienced contracting bodies tendering in competitive markets; that is, we only 
examine tenders in markets with at least 3 unique winners throughout 2009-2012, where 
markets are defined by product type (CPV4 level 3) and location (NUTS5 level 1); and issuers 
that have awarded at least 3 contracts in the 12 months period prior to the contract award in 
question. In addition, we also included a number of likely confounders in the regressions: (1)  
administrative capacity measured by number of employees of the issuer6; (2) institutional 
endowments measured by type of issuer (e.g. municipal, national); (3) product market and 
technological specificities measured by CPV division of products procured; (4) number of 
competitors on the market measured by the number of unique winners throughout 2009-2012 
on CPV level-3 product group and NUTS-1 geographic region; (5) contract size and length; 
and (6) regulatory changes as proxied by year of contract award. For full regression results, 
see Appendix B; for descriptive statistics of the resulting proxy indicators, see Table 4. 
For continuous corruption proxies such as the length of submission period (measured in days), 
thresholds had to be identified in order to reflect the non-linear character of corruption. This is 
because most values of continuous variables can be considered as reflections of diverse 
market practices, while some domains of outlier values are more associated with corruption. 
                                               
4 CPV=Common Procurement Vocabulary. For more info see: http://simap.europa.eu/codes-and-
nomenclatures/codes-cpv/codes-cpv_en.htm 
5 NUTS=Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics. For more info see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction 
6 Employment data derives from national administrative databases. 
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For example, giving 30-40 days for companies to prepare their bids carries little to no 
information on corruption risks, whereas when the advertisement period diminishes to 5-10 
days most experts suggest a spike in the risk of corruption. For more details on the 
identification of thresholds see (Fazekas, Tóth, & King, 2016). 
Once the regressions established the elementary validity of each corruption proxy7 (for further 
validity tests see the next section), we could calculate an arguably very simple indicator – 
single bidding - and a more complex composite indicator – the Corruption Risk Index (CRI). 
Reflecting the lack of detailed knowledge of which elementary corruption technique is a 
necessary, sufficient, or more important condition for corruption to occur, CRI is a simple 
arithmetic average of all 9 corruption proxies each falling in the 0-1 range. 
Each of the two corruption risk indicators, single bidding and CRI, has pros and cons. The 
strength of the single bidder indicator is that it is very simple and straightforward to interpret. 
However, its simplicity makes it more prone to gaming by corrupt actors, such as through the 
inclusion of fake bidders to mimic competition. The strength of the composite indicator 
approach (CRI) is that it explicitly tries to abstract from diverse market realities to capture the 
underlying corruption techniques. It allows for ‘red flag’ definitions to change from context to 
context in order to best capture the deviation from prevailing open and fair competitive norms. 
In addition, as corruption techniques used at any point in time are likely to be diverse in nature, 
tracking multiple possible corruption strategies in one composite score is the best method of 
ensuring consistent results even if the composition of underlying corruption techniques 
changes. Both of these characteristics underpin CRI’s usefulness for international and time-
series comparative research. The main weakness of CRI is that it can only capture a subset 
of corruption strategies in public procurement, arguably the simplest ones; it misses out on 
sophisticated types of corruption, such as corruption combined with inter-bidder collusion. But 
                                               
7 The winner contract share indicator has received less extensive discussion in this article, please refer 
to prior work for more details on it (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2016). 
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as long as the simplest strategies are the cheapest for corrupt groups, they are likely to 
represent the most widespread forms of corrupt behaviour. 
<<Table 4 here>> 
Validity of corruption proxies 
First, institutionalised grand corruption thrives on rents extracted from public procurement 
contracts, often through higher-than-competitive prices8. As detailed information on unit prices 
is missing, the only way to determine how expensive public procurement was is to compare 
the originally estimated contract value with the final contract value. Higher values of the ratio 
of contract value to estimated contract value indicate more expensive tenders (Ishii, 2009; 
Padhi & Mohapatra, 2011). By implication, this price ratio is expected to be positively 
associated with corruption risks.  
We find the expected relationship: both single bidder contracts and a higher CRI are 
associated with higher prices in linear regressions explaining relative contract price with single 
bidding or CRI while including control variables such as type of issuer, number of employees, 
product market, year of contract award,  and log contract value (Table 5). While effect sizes 
differ somewhat by country, they indicate that contracts awarded in the presence of ‘red flags’ 
are considerably more expensive: single bidder contracts have between 6-15% higher prices 
than multiple bidder contracts; similarly, contracts with one additional red flag (i.e. 1/9 CRI 
points higher) are 2-3% more pricey even after controlling for major confounding factors.  
<<Table 5 here>> 
Second, personal connections underpinning corrupt contracting are more likely to arise among 
local actors of close geographical proximity, such as organisations situated in the same town 
                                               
8 A more comprehensive assessment of indicator validity is provided for the Hungarian CRI by the 
authors (Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2016), In this paper we show that CRI in Hungary is correlated with 
higher profitability, politicians as owners or managers of companies, and company registration in 
offshore tax havens. 
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or region (Coviello & Gagliarducci, 2010; Lewis-Faupel, Neggers, Olken, & Pande, 2014). 
Hence, local firms are expected to contract in the presence of higher corruption risks than their 
non-local peers, all else being equal. This is exactly the relationship we find in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary: 7%* and 0% higher single bidder share; 0.05* and 0.01* points higher 
CRI respectively (differences marked with a * are significant at the conventional 5% level). 
Further validity tests using Hungarian and pan-EU data provide evidence of indicator validity 
(Fazekas & Kocsis, 2017; Fazekas, Tóth, et al., 2016). For example, in Hungary, non-domestic 
public procurement suppliers that are registered in tax havens such as Cyprus or Luxembourg 
have about 20% higher CRI score than companies registered in transparent jurisdictions such 
as Germany (significant at the conventional 5% level). 
Results 
Each of the three hypotheses is evaluated in turn below: first, the overall effect of additional 
external funding (EU Funds) on corruption risks is gauged. As EU Funds represent a bundle 
of effects on corruption, two detailed tests of impact mechanisms are explored. Second, 
individual risk components are compared across EU and nationally funded procurement 
contracts to determine the degree to which compliance is formalistic and administrative as 
opposed to substantive, leading to open and fair competition for government contracts. Third, 
public organisations making use of EU funding to different degrees are assessed in order to 
better understand whether those bodies whose spending is composed of 100% or close to 
100% EU Funds behave differently than those where EU Funds represent a small portion of 
organisational spending. We expect organisations solely spending EU Funds to be most 
detached from domestic accountability mechanisms, hence the highest corruption risk. 
The overall effect of EU Funds on high-level corruption 
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In the absence of random assignment to EU and national funding, the causal effect of EU 
Funds on corruption risks is estimated by matching contracts funded from national sources 
(control group) to tenders funded by the EU (treatment group) and comparing the two groups 
in terms of corruption risks. This approach directly reflects the theoretical framework by 
comparing the default funding source (national) to the funds representing additional resources 
as well as controls (EU Funds) on top of the national framework. Comparing tenders which 
are as similar as possible in every relevant respect except funding source allows for the 
approximation of the causal impact. The obvious limitation of this approach is that we cannot 
measure all the confounding factors, hence we cannot fully account for all the systematic 
differences between EU and nationally funded contracts contributing to corruption risks (i.e. 
the unconfoundedness condition may not be fully met). Thus, we employ state of the art 
matching methods which are widely employed in the program evaluation literature (Imbens & 
Wooldridge, 2009). 
Matching is superior to the simple, unmatched comparison of group means as long as the 
selection of EU-funded projects is itself not driven by corrupt considerations such as 
deliberately channelling EU Funds to markets where hiding corruption is easier. If selection is 
predominantly driven by corruption, the simple comparison is more appropriate than matching. 
As it is unclear to what degree EU Funds selection is driven by corrupt considerations, we 
interpret matched results as a lower bound and simple comparisons as an upper bound 
estimate of the causal impact. 
A baseline comparison of average corruption risk indicators without matching suggests that 
EU funded public procurement carries higher corruption risks than nationally funded public 
procurement (Table 6). EU funded procurement has a 9.6% higher single bidder share and 
0.04 point higher CRI than nationally funded procurement. Both of these differences are 
statistically significant and substantial compared to the baseline risk scores (28.1% single 
bidder share or 0.29 points CRI). However, these comparisons may very well be biased, as 
EU and non-EU funded projects could be fundamentally different. For example, EU funded 
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tenders are on average 12% larger than nationally funded tenders, hence they tend to be 
somewhat more complex. 
Therefore, we employ a propensity score matching technique that matches contracts that are 
as similar as possible in terms of 1) the main market of procured goods and services (2-digit 
DPV categories); 2) number of competitors on the market; 3) log contract value9; 4) year of 
contract award; 5) location of contract performance (NUTS1 regions); 6) type of procuring 
body (categories are listed in Table 4, lower panel); and 7) share of EU Funds within total 
organisational spending between 2009-2012. These confounding factors are controlled for as 
corruption risks and can be very different along these dimensions. While further controls could 
make our estimates more reliable, there are no further covariates which we could draw on in 
the database, and we believe that the major confounding factors are proxied with our 
approach.10 
Propensity score matching, taking into account confounding factors, reveals a similar picture 
as above, albeit one with slightly smaller effect magnitudes (Table 6)11. In the matched 
samples, EU funded procurement has 6.3% points higher single bidder share and 0.02 point 
higher CRI than nationally funded procurement. Both of these differences are statistically 
significant and substantial compared to the baseline risk scores (30.4% single bidder share or 
0.30 points CRI). 
<<Table 6 here>> 
These results provide supporting evidence in favour of H1: EU Funds increase institutionalised 
grand corruption in CEE. In order to better understand effect magnitudes, the price impact of 
the changes in single bidder percentages is calculated: given that single bidder contracts are 
                                               
9 In addition, our matching was also repeated using subsamples excluding below national reporting 
threshold contracts, i.e. contracts with value below 40,000 EUR; and excluding below EU-level reporting 
threshold contracts, i.e. 140,000 EUR. For full robustness test results see Appendix D.  
10 Potentially relevant missing variables which we would have been happy to use are variables 
characterising the projects the contracts belong to. 
11 See Appendix C for goodness of propensity score matching. 
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6-15% more expensive than multiple bidder contracts, EU Funds’ increased corruption risks 
pushed procurement prices up by an estimated 218-229 million EUR in 2009-2012, or 0.02 % 
of GDP in the Czech Republic and Hungary combined. 
Bureaucratic controls and formalistic compliance 
While the identified causal effect of EU Funds on corruption risks provides supporting evidence 
for H1, it fails to provide sufficient detail on the nature of impact mechanisms. In order to 
address this shortcoming, we now turn to H2 by exploring the differences between EU and 
nationally funded public procurement tenders on the level of individual risk factors by 
differentiating three types of corruption risks: i) easily observable and tightly monitored 
procedural risks (procedure type and not published call for tender); ii) hard to observe or 
benchmark, hence only partially monitored, procedural risks (length of eligibility criteria, weight 
of non-quantitative criteria, length of decision period, and modification of call for tenders); and 
iii) risks associated with bidding outcomes not monitored explicitly (single bidder and winner 
contract share). If, as H2 proposes, EU Funds redirect bureaucratic effort to formalistic, 
procedural compliance and away from substantive compliance supporting value for money 
and open competition, we expect to see three empirical patterns: i) easily observable and 
tightly monitored risks are lower in EU Funds than in national funds; ii) risk factors less readily 
observable and thus only partially monitored by EU control institutions are higher in EU than 
national funds; and iii) corruption risks directly capturing competitive outcomes are also higher 
in EU than national funds, reflecting barriers to entry and the emergence of corrupt collusive 
networks between public bodies and selected bidding firms. 
In line with H2, EU Funds have lower or equal corruption12 risks than national funds in the most 
visible procedural risks tightly monitored by oversight bodies (Table 7). First, procedure type 
risks are lower in EU funded procurement than in nationally funded, while not publishing the 
                                               
12 The fact that tight monitoring lowers selected observed corruption risks underlines the need for a 
broad-based corruption risk measurement methodology and a flexible measurement approach tracking 
changing organisational behaviour. 
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call for tenders in the official journal and leaving sufficient amount of time for publicizing a call 
are indistinguishable in the two groups. Second, more subtle and thus less readily monitored 
risks are more prevalent in EU Funds than in national funds: length of eligibility criteria, weight 
of non-quantitative assessment criteria, decision period length, and modifications to call for 
tenders are all more frequently present in EU funded procurement. Third and probably most 
importantly, risks present in tendering outcomes indicating whether competition is open and 
fair -- such as single bidding and winner contract share -- are both considerably higher in EU 
Funds than in national funds: single bidding is 8.7-8.9% more prevalent, while the winner’s 
contract share is 4.8-6.0% higher in EU Funds.  
<<Table 7 here>> 
EU Funds spending concentration 
The emerging evidence so far has been that bureaucratic controls associated with EU Funds 
increase corruption risks by encouraging formalistic compliance rather than genuinely open 
and fair competition. However, this picture is still incomplete, as we know relatively little about 
how EU Funds change organisational behaviour and accountability mechanisms that public 
organisations are subject to. As H3 suggests, those public bodies which predominantly or even 
exclusively spend from EU Funds are more detached from domestic accountability 
mechanisms (e.g. linking domestic taxation to local spending) and are driven by EU funding 
priorities and controls to a greater degree. This is expected to exacerbate the negative effects 
we have found thus far. 
In order to test H3 on the level of public organisations, we aggregated the contract-level 
database to the organisation level and ran a panel regression analysis on an annual basis 
between 2009 and 2012 (Table 8). In these regressions, the dependent variable is the CRI 
and the independent variable of interest is the share of EU funded contracts in total 
procurement spending (for the same regressions with single bidder % as dependent variable 
see Appendix E, findings are qualitatively the same). In line with preceding evidence, 
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organisations relying more extensively on EU Funds in their overall procurement spending are 
those that have higher total corruption risks. This effect is robust to multiple regression 
specifications: pooled OLS, between effects and random effects estimators (Models 1-3) while 
controlling for main organisational characteristics such as country, organization type (e.g. local 
or public utility), main sector (e.g. general public services or education), log spending value, 
number of employees, and use of state-of-the-art procurement tools (i.e. use of e-auctions). A 
Hausman test suggests the more efficient random effects estimator can be used (p=0.36). The 
effect remains essentially unchanged when using the lagged value of EU Funds’ share lending 
some support to a causal interpretation (Models 4-5). Most importantly, when considering the 
categorical rather than linear effect of EU Funds’ share, we find that most of the effect comes 
from the upper end of the distribution that is organisations funding their procurement spending 
almost entirely or entirely from EU Funds. Compared to organisations only making use of 
national funds, organisations with 75-99% EU funding achieve a CRI 0.01 points higher while 
those with 100% EU funding achieve 0.02 points higher (the same values for single bidding 
are 3% and 3.3%). Organisations with little to moderate amount of EU Funds, 1-74% EU 
Funds share, are statistically indistinguishable from public bodies with 0% EU funded 
procurement spending. This pronounced non-linearity suggests that it is the near complete 
replacement of domestic accountability mechanisms and domestic funding sources by EU 
Funds which produce the observed deteriorating corruption levels (i.e. increasing corruption 
risks), supporting H3.  
<<Table 8 here>> 
Appendix F contains results from the same regression specification, but on a sample restricted 
to municipalities representing a more homogenous sample where democratic controls are 
most direct (i.e. direct election of mayors and municipal councils) and no specialised agencies 
are included, such as a National Infrastructure Agency where EU Funds concentration could 
be correlated with the organisation type and goals. In this subsample results are essentially 
the same, while effect magnitudes increase. Compared to organisations only making use of 
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national funds, organisations with 75-99% EU funding achieve a CRI 0.02 points higher while 
those with 100% EU funding achieve 0.03 points higher. 
Conclusions 
Findings suggest that accountability mechanisms and resources associated with EU Structural 
and Cohesion Funds increase institutionalised grand corruption in two characteristic countries 
of CEE: the Czech Republic and Hungary. The estimated effect is highly significant and non-
negligible: EU Funds increase corruption risks by up to 34% compared to national democratic 
accountability mechanisms (single bidding ratio increasing from 0.28 to 0.38, see Table 6). 
Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, this increases contracting costs between 2009-2012 
by an estimated 218-229 million EUR, or 0.02 % of the two countries’ combined GDP. 
We attribute a considerable portion of the negative impact of EU Funds to two impact 
mechanisms: i) formalistic, administrative compliance with prescriptions rather than a genuine 
improvement in competitive outcomes like the number of bidders; and ii) the negative effects 
are predominantly driven by public organisations where EU Funds represent the 
overwhelming majority of organisational procurement spending. It is these organizations that 
are most insulated from national accountability mechanisms and funding channels. 
The policy consequences of our analysis are profound. Our findings suggest that in order to 
better control corruption in Structural and Regional Funds, the EU should focus on increasing 
access to and competition for its funds disbursed in the least developed regions instead of 
excessively relying on bureaucratic controls to better control corruption (Duvanova, 2014). In 
addition, it also follows that excessive EU Funds reliance of recipient public bodies should be 
avoided in order to maintain the link between local taxes, local policy performance, and local 
civil society oversight. For example, policy makers could set upper limits on the ratio of EU 
Funds to own funds for beneficiary organisations. And as this analysis has already 
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demonstrated, using Big Data solutions to monitor competitive outcomes and identify red flags 
early on can support accountability in EU Funds spending. 
Further research could replicate this article’s methodology in other EU member states (and 
even for donor spending in developing countries), which would contribute to a comprehensive 
corruption monitoring framework. More work would be needed to unearth if similar effects and 
mechanisms are present in other countries and to provide a more detailed picture of how 
bureaucracies respond to incentives presented by EU Funds (e.g. looking at how bureaucratic 
resources are shared between EU and national funds). Further research could also map out 
a wider range of impact mechanisms accounting for a larger portion of the total variance of 
the observed impact. For example, by linking company information to public procurement 
records, companies’ reliance on government contracts and EU Funds could be explored as a 
further determinant of corruption risks. Linking publicly available, detailed information on EU  
funded projects to the corresponding procurement tenders would allow researchers to explore 
the interactions between EU Funds and national spending in even greater detail. 
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Table 1. Main statistics of the analysed data by country, total public procurement spending, 2009-
2012 
 Czech Republic Hungary Total 
Total number of contracts awarded (with valid contract value) 53,024 51,635 104,659 
Total number of unique winners 9,264 10,940 20,204 
Total number of unique issuers 4,432 5,295 9,727 
Combined value of awarded contracts (million EUR)* 40,685 11,768 52,453 
Combined value of awarded contracts (% GDP)** 6.8% 3.1% 5.3% 
Notes: * Exchanged into EUR using average monthly exchange rate of the contract award, not corrected for 
inflation;** GDP figures are from Eurostat (GDP at market prices). 
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% OF TOTAL 
PROCUREMENT 
SPENDING 





14,600 12,609 31.1% 31.0% 11.1% 
HUNGARY 14,110 5,663 34.4% 48.1% 12.7% 
Note: * public procurement to general procurement expenditure ratio is obtained from (OECD, 2013). 
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Table 3. Summary of elementary corruption risk indicators 
PROC. PHASE INDICATOR NAME INDICATOR VALUES 
SUBMISSION 
Call for tenders publication 
0=call for tender published in official journal  
1=NO call for tender published in official journal 
Call for tender modification 
0=NOT modified call for tenders  
1=modified call for tenders 
Procedure type 
0=open procedure 
1=non-open procedure (e.g. invitation tender) 
Length of eligibility criteria Number of characters relative to market average 
Length of advertisement 
period 
Number of days between the publication of call for tenders and 
the submission deadline (for short submission periods weekends 
are deducted) 
ASSESSMENT 
Weight of non-quantitative 
evaluation criteria 
Sum of weights for evaluation criteria which are NOT related to 
prices or quantities 
Length of decision period 
number of days between submission deadline and announcing 
contract award 
OUTCOME 
Single bidder contract 
(valid/received) 
0=more than 1 bid received  
1=1 bid received 
Winner contract share 
12-month total contract value of winner / 12-month total awarded 
contract value by issuer 
  




Table 4. Summary statistics of corruption proxies used in the analysis 
corruption proxy single bid CRI 
mean 0.319 0.301 
p25  0.187 
p50  0.268 
p75  0.417 
standard deviation 0.466 0.168 
N 84,682 82,438 
mean by buyer size category (nr.of employees) 
<=10 0.255 0.376 
10<x<=25 0.231 0.364 
25<x<=50 0.362 0.369 
50<x<=100 0.364 0.331 
100<x<=500 0.333 0.310 
500<x 0.291 0.279 
missing 0.335 0.285 
mean by buyer type 
national 0.398 0.305 
regional/local 0.327 0.300 
supported body 0.228 0.297 
established by public law 0.317 0.296 
other/private 0.349 0.330 
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Table 5. Ordinary least-squares regressions of relative contract price, by country, 2009-2012 
dependent variable relative contract price (contract price/estimated price) 
country CZ HU 
independent variables     
single bid=1 0.152***  0.063***  
sign. 0.000  0.000  
CRI  0.282***  0.221*** 
sign.  0.000  0.000 
each regression contains constant 
control variables: type of issuer, number of employees, product market; year of contract award; log contract value 
N 32,997 32,997 25,456 25,062 
R2 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.05 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standard errors obtained using Monte Carlo random permutations (300 
repetitions) in stata 12.0 
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Table 6. Naïve and sophisticated comparisons of EU and non-EU funded tenders’ single bid % and 
CRI, 2009-2012, CZ-HU combined 










non-EU funded 0.281 0.304 0.290 0.303 
EU funded 0.377 0.367 0.325 0.321 
diff(EU funded - non-EU f.) 0.096*** 0.063*** 0.035*** 0.018*** 
95% conf.interval-lower bound 0.089 0.055 0.032 0.015 
95% conf.interval-upper bound 0.103 0.072 0.037 0.021 
N non-EU funded 56,372 25,860 54,864 25,533 
N EU-funded 27,917 25,860 27,365 25,533 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standard errors obtained using Monte Carlo random permutations (300 
repetitions) in stata 12.0; propensity score matching using psmatch2, nearest neighbour, logit, no replacement, common 
  




Table 7. Summary of driving factors of CRI differences between EU and non-EU funded projects, 
2009-2012, Number of Contracts=85,777 






Procedure type -0.060*** -0.114*** 
NO call for tenders published in o. journal 0.015*** 0.003 
Length of advertisement period -0.005*** 0.001 
Length of eligibility criteria 0.074*** 0.086*** 
Weight of non-quantitative evaluation criteria 0.046*** 0.040*** 
Length of decision period 0.023*** 0.024*** 
Modification of call for tenders 0.034*** 0.036*** 
Single bid 0.089*** 0.087*** 
Winner contract share 0.060*** 0.048*** 








Table 8. Organisation-level linear and panel regressions of CRI on EU Funds spending share, organisations with at least 2 contracts per year for at least 2 
years 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS BE RE RE RE RE 
Dependent variable Corruption Risk Index 
EU Funds' share 0.0208*** 0.0364*** 0.0181***  0.0117**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.026)  
Lag EU Funds' share    0.0214*** 0.0178***  
    (0.000) (0.001)  
Ref. cat.: 0% EU Funds       
       
0%<EU Funds' share<36%      0.0036 
      (0.482) 
36%<EU Funds' share<75%      0.0041 
      (0.433) 
75%<EU Funds' share<100%      0.0098* 
      (0.077) 
100% EU Funds      0.0240*** 
       (0.000) 
Control variables       
Country X X X X X X 
Organization type X X X X X X 
Main sector X X X X X X 
Log spending value X X X X X X 
Nr.of employees X X X X X X 
Use of e-auctions X X X X X X 
Observations 6495 6495 6495 4220 4220 6326 
N (organisations)  2454 2454 2135 2135 2435 
R2 (overall) 0.144 0.138 0.144 0.165 0.166 0.146 
Note: p-values in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 




Appendix A – Public procurement data sources used 
Table A1. Primary sources of public procurement data and minimum thresholds 
Country 
Institute holding and publishing 
PPC data 








Hungary Közbeszerzési Hatóság http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/ 27,300 
 
  
                                               
13 Thresholds refer to 2012, classical issuers, in services sector. National currencies are converted to 
EUR using official exchange rates of 5/2/2013 of the European Central Bank. 
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Appendix B – Regression analysis modelling corrupt rent extraction 
Table B1 Binary logistic regression results on contract level, 2009-2012, by country, average marginal 
effects (nr. of winners >=3 and nr. of contracts awarded in 12 months>=3) 
 
Source: PPC; Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standard errors obtained using Monte Carlo random permutations (300 
repetitions) in stata 12.0  
NO call for tenders in off.journal (open proc.) 0.192*** NO call for tenders in off.journal (open proc.) 0.133***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
Procedure type Procedure type
ref. cat.=open procedure ref. cat.=open procedure
1=invitation procedure -0.093*** 1=invitation procedure 0.06***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
2=negotiation procedure 0.09*** 2=negotiation procedure 0.065***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
3=outside PP law -0.202*** 3=other/framework procedure 0.245***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
4=other/missing/erroneous procedure type 0.013 4=outside PP law 0.003
sign. 0.453 sign. 0.820
Length of eligibility criteria Length of eligibility criteria
ref.cat.= criteria lenth <-626.52 ref.cat.= crit.length<-2922.13
2= -626.52<criteria length<=864.32 0.078*** 2= -2922.13<crit.length<=520.7 0.037***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
3= 864.32<crit.length<=3403.1 0.056*** 3= 520.7<crit.length<=2639.73 0.081***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
4= 3403.1<crit.length 0.111*** 4= 2639.73<crit.length 0.085***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
5= missing crit. length 0.121 5= missing crit. length 0.043***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
Modification of call for tenders 0.012 Modification of call for tenders -0.031**
sign. 0.103 sign. 0.007
Length of submission period Length of submission period
ref.cat.=s.period>60 ref.cat.=s.period>20
2= 40<s.period<=60 0.063*** 2= 17<s.period<=20 0.001
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.877
3= 37<s.period<=40 0.082*** 3= 5<s.period<=14 0.1***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
4= 19<s.period<=37 0.019* 4= 0<s.period<=5 (incl.weekend) 0.212***
sign. 0.050 sign. 0.000
5= 0<=s.period<=19 0.064*** 5=missing 0.089***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
6=missing submission period 0.043
sign. 0.490
Weight of non-price evaluation criteria Weight of non-price evaluation criteria
ref.cat.=0<non-price criteria w.<=0.3 ref.cat.=0<non-price criteria w.<=0.4
1= non-price criteria w.=0 0.141*** 1=non-price criteria w.=0 0.047***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
3= 0.3<non-price criteria w.<=0.44 0.038*** 3= 0.4<non-price criteria w.<=0.556 0.092***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
4= 0.44<non-price criteria w.<=1 0.078*** 4= 0.556<non-price criteria w.<1 0.118**
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.003
5= missing criteria 0.306*** 5= 0.9<=non-price criteria w.<=1 0.03**
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.003
Length of decision period Length of decision period
ref.cat.= 106<dec.period<=170 ref.cat.= 44<dec.period<=182
1= 0<dec.period<=54 0.24*** 1= 0<dec.period<=32 0.14***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
2= 54<dec.period<=78 0.118*** 2= 32<dec.period<=44 0.054***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
3= 78<dec.period<=106 0.083*** 4= 182<dec.period 0.162***
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.000
5= 170<dec.period 0.058*** missing -0.041**
sign. 0.000 sign. 0.007
6= missing decision period 0.463***
sign. 0.000
constant included in each regression
control variables: type of issuer, number of 
N 44471 32000
Pseudo-R2 0.256 0.111
Dependent var: single bidder contract (1), multi-bidder contract (0)
Czech Republic Hungary
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Appendix C - Goodness of propensity score matching 
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Figure C2. Balance of samples before and after matching on the variable level in Czech Republic and 








Table C1. Summary statistics of matching quality in Czech Republic and Hungary, pstest in psmatch2 
package of stata 12.0 
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias B R %Var 
Unmatched 0.418 44119.9 0.000 13.6 7.9 187.8* 1.10 50 
Matched 0.223 16737.7 0.000 6.9 2.4 122.3* 1.75 100 
 
  




Appendix D – Robustness of propensity score matching: excluding low value contracts 
Table D1. Matched comparisons of EU and non-EU funded tenders’ single bid % and CRI, 2009-
2012, CZ-HU combined (contract value above 40,000 EUR) 










non-EU funded 0.284 0.273 0.315 0.312 
EU funded 0.338 0.337 0.331 0.330 
diff(EU funded - non-EU f.) 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
95% conf.interval-lower bound 0.046 0.054 0.013 0.014 
95% conf.interval-upper bound 0.063 0.073 0.019 0.021 
N non-EU funded 31,793 16,713 31,681 16,463 
N EU-funded 16,800 16,713 16,558 16,463 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standard errors obtained using Monte Carlo random permutations (300 
repetitions) in stata 12.0; propensity score matching using psmatch2, nearest neighbour, logit, no replacement, common 
 
Table D2. Matched comparisons of EU and non-EU funded tenders’ single bid % and CRI, 2009-
2012, CZ-HU combined (contract value above 140,000 EUR) 










non-EU funded 0.262 0.240 0.330 0.321 
EU funded 0.290 0.289 0.337 0.336 
diff(EU funded - non-EU f.) 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 
95% conf.interval-lower bound 0.017 0.037 0.003 0.011 
95% conf.interval-upper bound 0.040 0.062 0.011 0.021 
N non-EU funded 31,793 16,713 31,681 16,463 
N EU-funded 16,800 16,713 16,558 16,463 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standard errors obtained using Monte Carlo random permutations (300 








Appendix E – Organisation-level regressions on single bidder ratio 
Table E1. Organisation-level linear and panel regressions of single bidder ratio on EU Funds spending share, organisations with at least 2 contracts per year 
for at least 2 years 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS BE RE RE RE RE 
Dependent variable single bidder ratio 
EU Funds' share 0.0307** 0.0675*** 0.0278**  -0.0006  
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)  (0.963)  
Lag EU Funds' share    0.0550*** 0.0552***  
    (0.000) (0.000)  
Ref. cat.: 0% EU Funds       
       
0%<EU Funds' share<36%      0.0258 
      (0.051) 
36%<EU Funds' share<75%      0.0181 
      (0.168) 
75%<EU Funds' share<100%      0.0296** 
      (0.033) 
100% EU Funds      0.0330** 
            (0.002) 
Control variables       
Country X X X X X X 
Organization type X X X X X X 
Main sector X X X X X X 
Log spending value X X X X X X 
Nr.of employees X X X X X X 
Use of e-auctions X X X X X X 
Observations 7854 7854 7854 4925 4925 7599 
N (organisations)  2572 2572 2355 2355 2559 
R2 (overall) 0.044 0.039 0.044 0.032 0.032 0.042 
Note: p-values in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix F – Municipal-level regressions on CRI 
Table F1. Organisation-level linear and panel regressions of CRI on EU Funds spending share, municipalities with at least 2 contracts per year for at least 2 
years 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS BE RE RE RE RE 
Dependent variable Corruption Risk Index 








Lag EU Funds' share 




   
(0.000) (0.002) 
 
Ref. cat.: 0% EU Funds 
      
 
      
0%<EU Funds' share<36% 
     
0.0181** 
 
     
(0.013) 
36%<EU Funds' share<75% 
     
0.0158** 
 
     
(0.023) 
75%<EU Funds' share<100% 
     
0.0225*** 
 
     
(0.002) 
100% EU Funds 
     
0.0308*** 
  
     
(0.000) 
Control variables 
      
Country X X X X X X 
Organization type X X X X X X 
Main sector X X X X X X 
Log spending value X X X X X X 
Nr.of employees X X X X X X 
Use of e-auctions X X X X X X 
Observations 3711 3711 3711 2402 2402 3581 
N (organisations) 
 
1473 1473 1243 1243 1456 
R2 (overall) 0.12 0.114 0.119 0.13 0.134 0.123 
Note: p-values in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix G – Additional descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis 
Figure G1. Yearly histograms of log contract values, Czech Republic 
 
  




Figure G2. Yearly histograms of log contract values, Hungary 
 
Table G1. Number of contracts awarded by country, year and funding source 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Czech 
Republic 
national funds 10,572 8,841 7,120 8,780 35,313 
EU Funds 3,458 4,904 4,176 5,173 17,711 
Hungary 
national funds 7,641 10,814 7,718 5,458 31,631 
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Figure G3. Quarterly average single bidder ratio by funding source(unmatched samples), Czech 
Republic 
 
Figure G4. Quarterly average single bidder ratio by funding source(unmatched samples), Hungary 
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Figure G5. Quarterly average CRI by funding source (unmatched samples), Czech Republic 
 
Figure G6. Quarterly average CRI by funding source (unmatched samples), Hungary 
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